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ABSTRACT 
This article examines executive compensation in the United States, France, 
and the Netherlands. A brief review of  executive compensation literature is 
conducted  to  expose its implicit  value  systems. Next,  a qualitative study 
examines the interpretive schemas that executives express about the  pay- 
performance  relationship;  US-developed  expectancy  theory  and  agency 
theory serve as a benchmark. The results indicate that US executives under- 
stand compensation in different terms from those employed by their Euro- 
pean counterparts. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a first attempt to explore issues of executive compensa- 
tion in a cross-cultural context. We review some pertinent literature, present 
findings from  semi-structured  interviews in several countries, and comple- 
ment them with a quantitative comparison of incentive systems. The  objective 
is  to determine whether ideas and practices of  executive compensation are 
culturally conditioned. 
The reward  system is one of  the  most prominent attributes of  complex 
organizations.  Numerous  studies  have  examined  its  design,  motivational 
significance and efficacy. Much of this research, however, has been conducted 
by industrial and organizational psychologists who focused on relatively low 
organizational levels (e.g. Lawler, 1976). Much of that research tradition may 
have little relevance for executive compensation systems, in which perform- 
ance measurement is imperfect and vague, and pay-performance  connections 
are tenuous (compare Brindisi, 1982; Larcker and Lambert, 1985; Murphy, 
1985; Pennings  and  Bussard,  1989). We  might  call  such  reward  systems 
‘strategic’ in that their beneficiaries have a substantial impact on the long- 
term results of their firm (Pennings, 1991). There is far less literature on this 
topic; and except for a small amount of academic accounting research, it often 
appears heavily prescriptive. A good overview is provided by Ehrenberg and 
Milkovich ( 1988). 
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Furthermore, much of the debate and research on compensation has had 
a distinctively US origin and may well reflect values or traditions that vary 
from those of other societies. Pay issues, for example, are a strong preoccupa- 
tion in the US, both in the academic and the popular business  press. The 
US business press  (e.g. Business  Week, 1989, and others) presents numerous 
‘cover stories’ on the topic, and plays a strong role in cultivating corporate 
heroes, whereas overseas periodicals appear to shun such coverage. 
In the academic press, similar patterns exist. Issues of executive compensa- 
tion,  widely  studied  in  the  US,  seem  to  have  attracted  scant  academic 
attention in other countries, such as France, Germany, or the Netherlands. 
In the academic literature, most of the pertinent findings have been generated 
by US researchers studying US executive compensation practices. Ironically, 
Becker (1985) reviews primarily US sources, perhaps because of  a dearth of 
German and other non-US publications. 
This article follows a two-pronged approach: first, we review literature that 
is gauged to be typical in its depiction of executive compensation, using US 
literature on Compensation as our standard of comparison. Against a back- 
ground of cross-national differences, we present findings from qualitative field 
research in different countries to uncover implicit or explicit notions among 
practitioners and executives. This inquiry represents a first step toward the 
development of a ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) about cultu- 
rally conditioned compensation practices. 
In short, we explore differences in reward systems and practices in relation 
to value disparities and indigenous traditions. Our focus is on such questions 
as: what interpretive schemas do people in different organizations espouse 
about performance-reward  relationships, and do they signal national differ- 
ences? Do  such  schemas  mirror  values  that  vary  across  nations? These 
dimensions of  analysis lead to a more decisive statement on cross-national 
differences in compensation. 
BACKGROUND 
Compensation and Performance 
Reward systems evoke a wide spectrum of reactions, and many organizations 
actively continue to experiment with them. Thus, not surprisingly, they have 
stimulated  a  large  body  of  research.  The review of  dominant  theoretical 
streams of work from psychologists and academic accounting researchers may 
reveal the underpinnings of executive compensation practices (compare Lar- 
cker and Lambert, 1985, and Lawler, 1976, respectively). The assumption is 
that beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour surrounding the remuneration of senior 
executives can be accessed as much by prevailing theories as they can from 
the  content  analysis of  documents and personal  interviews.  Psychologists 
primarily employ some version of expectancy theory, while accounting resear- 
chers tend to espouse a neoclassical equivalent such as agency theory. Much 
of this research is American in origin and thus might be expected to mirror 
US values; a brief review should be helpful, however, in anchoring a sociology 
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of knowledge geared to examining certain manifestations of executive reward 
systems. 
Simply  stated,  expectancy  theorists  examine  rewards  as motivators  of 
performance. Agency  theory considers how rewards can shift the risk from 
stockholders/owners  to managers in such a way as to align the two parties’ 
interests. A central difference is the tendency of the former to posit individual 
differences, while the latter invokes a microeconomic premise, treating indi- 
viduals in a standardized fashion. Overall, however, both presume an ‘ato- 
mistic’ notion of organizations. 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory  is  a  cognitive  psychological variant of economic utility 
theory  that presumes  a propensity  among individuals to maximize benefits 
and minimize costs. Crucial elements of the theory are the perceived relation- 
ships between effort and performance and between performance and rewards; 
rewards have motivational impact to the extent that they have high utility or 
‘valence’ for the individual (Lawler, 1976). Expectancy theorists have exami- 
ned group- and organization-based  pay schemes (e.g. the so-called Scanlon 
profit-sharing plan), often with mixed results. Much of the relevant research 
has been conducted on lower-level  employees. Yet executive Compensation 
systems have been described  (e.g. Lawler,  1983) within the tenets of expec- 
tancy theory and evaluated on their motivational  efficacy. For example, do 
executives perceive the existence of a relationship between their performance 
levels  and  their  compensation?  If  this  correlation  is  high,  and  great 
remunerative or symbolic value is attributed to executive pay, executives will 
be motivated  to higher performance levels (Lawler, 1983). 
Agency Theory 
Microeconomists, particularly those espousing agency theory (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling,  1976)  reject  such  caveats,  assuming  that  compensation  has  a 
universal  incentive  effect on people’s  behaviour  and performance.  Certain 
types of incentives are interpreted as aligning the owners’ interests with those 
of the firm’s executives.  In the case of fixed compensation, such as ‘straight 
salary’, the executive  is  shielded from risk  and is therefore able to pursue 
inappropriate strategies. Variable compensation, such as stock options, shifts 
part  of  the  stockholders’  risk  to  the  executives,  creating  the  proverbial 
incestuous relationship  between them. 
Presumably, when owners’ and executives’ interests overlap through incen- 
tive systems such as stock options, ideal opportunities for executive control 
exist.  Such overlap  is  desirable whenever  the agent  enjoys  informational 
advantage over the principal. Rather than eliminating informational asym- 
metry  (an option that is costly and rarely feasible), the incentive system is 
designed to render such asymmetry irrelevant. In this vein, the chairman of 
the board  and his  board  of  directors  can guide the firm in  a  ‘cybernetic’ 
fashion  by  instituting  incentives  to  entice their  executives’ behaviour  and 
performance toward certain targets. 
Executive reward  systems therefore  often  take the form of a contractual 
arrangement between  the  firm  (or its  board  of  directors)  and  its  senior 
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management officers. Such officers often have a great deal of their remunera- 
tion at risk. While the overwhelming majority of employees in most organiza- 
tions work under conditions of a fixed payout system, many senior executives 
have  a  certain  portion  of  their  income  as  a  variable  component.  This 
component  includes  bonuses, stock options,  performance  share plans, and 
newer forms of ‘long-term incentive compensation plans’. This component in 
particular is central in the use of agency theory for explaining and describing 
executive Compensation systems. Since contingent pay implies flexibility, it 
instils commensurate pay-performance  expectancies. 
Some Empirical Euidence 
Several accounting researchers have tried to demonstrate that executive pay 
is strongly related to the accounting-based performance criteria of their firm 
(e.g. Murphy, 1985). Their efforts have been exemplary in approximating the 
cash value of  an executive’s compensation. The empirical work of authors 
such as Murphy (1985) is testimony to their success. They seem to provide 
the best evidence that the tenets of expectancy and agency theory have some 
validity.  Nonetheless,  scepticism  about executive  reward  systems remains, 
particularly  on  whether  large components  of  variable  pay  induce  certain 
behaviours  or lead  to  higher  performance  levels  (e.g. Ungson  and Steers, 
1984). This scepticism acquires extra weight when the debate is extended to 
other cultures. Unfortunately, pertinent research has been largely restricted 
to US firms, making the question difficult to deal with. 
Performance  might  pertain  not  only  to  financial  or  other  measurable 
outcome criteria, but also to more equivocal and imponderable aspects, even 
if these could be linked to financial measures. Langbert (1990), for example, 
in  examining firm  reputation,  contrasted  ‘excellent’ companies with  ‘least 
admired’  ones  according to  whether  they  offered  stock  options.  Excellent 
firms more frequently display such ‘ex post-performance’-based compensation, 
while the least admired ones have a greater preponderance of ‘ex ante’-based 
pay, such as profit-sharing, salary, and fringe benefits. Langbert’s research 
could probably not be carried out in Europe. Not only are ex ante-based pay 
systems infrequent and rarely studied, even expost-based pay systems have not 
been examined extensively. The framing of such studies may be contingent 
upon a society’s  having nurtured a social creed  of  ‘market justice’  (Lane, 
1986). 
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Needless  to  say, these issues  acquire  extra significance  when  we  consider 
executive reward systems in different societies. Organizations are institutions 
that exhibit  the values  and norms of their  societies  (Zucker,  1977). What 
others (e.g. Selznick, 1957) have called institutionalization  is merely a state- 
ment about an organization’s quest for legitimacy that hinges on its environ- 
ment’s expectations. In this vein, publicized executive compensation systems 
among US firms are symbolic messages that signify compliance with sound 
management practices and also communicate the contractual value of ‘One 
gets what one deserves’. 
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An  intriguing question, consequently, is  the extent  to which  managerial 
theories  are culture-bounded,  together with  the possibility  that those very 
theories describe,  explain  and legitimize extant practices in the very same 
countries. As we have seen, expectancy and agency theory have an American 
provenance, and although diffused to European countries, still can be seen 
as  reflecting  American  world  views  (Hofstede,  1983).  In  these  theories, 
individuals are depicted  as responsible for their own actions and in charge 
of  their  own  achievements.  Contractually,  each  person  is  bound  to  the 
employer,  who is  the ‘principal’. The observation  that heavy  reliance  on 
formalization  and ‘due process’ is in accord with American  traditions was 
made earlier by Hickson et al. (1974), and recently reaffirmed by d’Iribarne 
(1989). 
Unfortunately, empirically tested social science theories about motivation, 
decision-making and organizational behaviour in other cultures have not yet 
been advanced. ‘Do American theories apply abroad?’  Hofstede (1983) asks. 
He, among others, has argued that expectancy theory accentuates individual- 
ism and achievement values and should be construed as an expression of US 
culture, which  may have limited  validity or utility  in other societies. The 
transfer of compensation practices predicated on expectancy theory or other 
motivational paradigms,  from the US to other societies  or vice  versa, could 
therefore be of questionable value. Furthermore, not only may the US-biased 
literature convey  a  certain  cultural outlook, but also American  executives 
themselves  may express views consistent with the tenets of expectancy and 
agency  theories.  We assume  that the  theories  reviewed  can be seen  as a 
barometer  of  the  thinking  of  today’s  enlightened  academic  supporters  of 
executive compensation as practiced in the US. Their counterparts in Euro- 
pean countries may express different opinions and attitudes. This issue will 
be explored further here. 
Culture and its  Consequences 
From  these  observations,  a  fairly  clear  picture  emerges  of  the  frame of 
reference expressed by organizational psychologists and academic accounting 
researchers in the US regarding compensation issues. Their frame of reference 
mirrors the values of the society into which  they were socialized and could 
accordingly be contrasted with those of France and the Netherlands. In  these 
societies there is virtually no academic literature on executive compensation 
and the various forms it takes. Naturally, this in itself points to the presence 
of culturally based differences. If European scholars understand  compensa- 
tion differently, they may not consider variable pay a relevant concept. 
The long-standing debate on cross-cultural differences and their relevance, 
if any, for understanding organizational behaviour in general and compensa- 
tion practices in particular, are still inconclusive. Recent research, however, 
is beginning  to uncover the existence of pronounced cultural differences in 
value systems in different countries that might shed some light on differences 
in reward systems and the way they are used. The work of Hofstede (1980) 
and d’Iribarne (1989) is particularly germane to these issues. These authors 
complement one another; Hofstede provides a contemporary identification of 
value systems, while d’Iribarne develops a more historical perspective. 
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Hofstede’s Study 
An important study by  Hofstede  (1980) has identified strong variations  in 
national cultures and their consequences. His study involved 50 countries, 
including the three that are the focus of the present article. From this massive 
survey on values, Hofstede constructed four cultural factors that vary cross- 
culturally. These include masculinity, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
and power distance. 
A  key  finding for  the  present  discussion  is  the  ‘masculinity’ factor.  In 
masculine cultures, traditionally defined gender roles are preponderant; men 
are expected to be assertive, ambitious and motivated by material success. 
In ‘feminine’ societies, in contrast, traditional stereotypical gender roles have 
become diffuse. In addition, there is a concern for the weak, underprivileged 
members of  society and an emphasis on expressive, positive interpersonal 
relationships.  Hofstede  also  showed  northwestern  European  and  North 
American societies to be relatively high on individualism and low on uncer- 
tainty avoidance (disinclination toward ambiguity, risk-taking and so on). 
Another important implication for  the  present  study pertains  to  power 
distance, which designates values accentuating authority and power differ- 
ences.  France,  with  its  higher  score  on  power  distance,  might  rely  on 
compensation  differences  as  a  means  of  further  accentuating  a  person’s 
position in a stratified society. Initial comparative investigations (e.g. Begue, 
1976) showed  France  to  have  very  unequal  income  distributions,  which 
became amplified  after tax, unlike in any other country. This condition is 
rapidly being altered, however. In the 1962-83  period, for example, France 
showed a dramatic decrease in the before-tax income gap between high-level 
executives (cadres supirieures) and employees. During this period income taxes 
became increasingly progressive, thus further eroding such income inequality 
(INSEE,  1982).  These  trends  render  France  more  similar  to  other  EC 
countries. France also has a comparatively high uncertainty avoidance level, 
signalling an interesting paradoxical aspect of income and wealth distribu- 
tion.  This could imply that income should not be at risk. In other words, 
people want to anticipate their payout, regardless  of performance or other 
income variation-producing factors beyond their control. 
The consequences  of  such value differences are not  trivial. Core values 
shape the importance that individuals attribute to various rewards, a fact that 
has  powerful  implications for what  motivates them  (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977). Within the realm of expectancy theory, for example, the worth that 
individuals attribute to certain outcomes hinges on the values they espouse. 
For example, in masculine societies, achievement and self-actualization are 
salient. Major psychological theories of motivation, such as those of Vroom 
(1964) and Maslow (1970), in fact, posit such elements as central ingredients 
of  an individual’s motivational makeup. The French aversion for risk  and 
uncertainty makes bonus and other compensation features that put some of 
its recipient’s income in jeopardy unsuited to its motivational climate. Shift- 
ing some of the risk from owners/stockholders to managers would doubtless 
lead to complications the agency theorists do not foresee. 
According  to  Hofstede, both  expectancy  theory  and  agency  theory  are 
culturally conditioned. Expectancy theory presumes individualism and mas- 
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Table I. Three countries’ values indices 
USA  France  Netherlands 
Power distance  40  68  38 
Uncertainty avoidance  46  86  53 
Individualism  91  71  ao 
Masculinity  62  43  14 
Source: Hofstede (1980) 
culinity, while agency theory surmises a tolerance for uncertainty. One might 
add that other aspects of  executive compensation, whether in the form of 
elaborate long-term incentive compensation systems or corporate perks, could 
likewise be culturally conditioned. 
Table I presents the value indices as they are reported by Hofstede (1980). 
Compared with the United  States, France and the Netherlands are rather 
feminine. France scores comparatively highly on power distance as-well  as 
uncertainty  avoidance,  which  may  induce its  executives to  shun  firms  in 
which their income is at risk. Masculinity is manifest in the desire for heroes 
- the glorification  of  individual  success and  achievement - which,  when 
combined with low uncertainty avoidance, bodes well for American execu- 
tives, who are strongly inclined to favour having a large proportion of variable 
compensation. 
In general, in individualistic societies, one would expect a stronger ten- 
dency to define performance in individual terms, as well as widespread efforts 
to link personal success with individual compensation. Compensation differ- 
ences are likely  to be more pronounced  among individuals, although they 
may be tempered by other values, most notably feminine ones. 
In collectivistic  and  feminine  societies, one  would  encounter  relatively 
minor differences in compensation. This should be discernible in the compen- 
sation practices -  for example, in decisions about the granting of  bonuses. 
Strategic performance is more a group accomplishment than an individual 
one. In addition, there is a reluctance to stand out financially. In masculine 
societies, in contrast, where executives ‘should get what they deserve’, one 
might expect to see greater efforts to define success as a basis for pay. 
The Ethos of  Honour (d’lribarne) 
Recently, d’Iribarne (1989) published a study that is also highly pertinent to 
the  arguments of  this  article.  While  Hofstede  furnishes  a  cross-sectional 
description,  d’hibarne is  more  historical  in  his  diagnostic  description  of 
management practices in three societies -  incidentally, the identical ones to 
those examined here -  France, the Netherlands and the US. Drawing heavily 
from historical analyses such as those of Alexis de Tocqueville, he tries to 
interpret the findings of  a survey  conducted on  three industrial sites. The 
image that emerges shows how management in each of these countries has 
its unique strategy for limiting individual autonomy without inciting resist- 
ance and alienation. 
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D’Iribarne claims that the US is a society in which traditions, such as the 
Pilgrim Fathers’ covenant, have contributed to formation of the employment 
relationship  as  an exchange  relationship  among  equals,  not  unlike  that 
between buyers  and sellers in  the marketplace.  Employers  and employees 
engage  in  a  contract,  with  the  latter  supplying  labour  (or its  marginal 
productivity) in exchange for a price; employees, in return, are entitled to a 
‘fair’ or  ‘equitable’ wage  provided  they  contribute their  part of  the deal. 
Detailed,  formal  regulations  spell  out  the  conditions  that govern  such  a 
contract, with grievance procedures in place to resolve disputes that were not 
anticipated at the time of contracting. D’Iribarne’s portrayal of US industrial 
practices mirrors Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) metaphor of organizations as 
a ‘nexus of contracts’, and is in accord with Hofstede’s discovery that the US 
is heavily individualistic and masculine. 
The Netherlands is governed by a system of consultation aimed at produc- 
ing consensus. Not unlike Japanese practices, people in Dutch organizations 
spend a great deal of time in both formal and informal meetings, while every 
individual is expected to accommodate his position to the emerging consen- 
sus. A  boss  should  confer with  subordinates, explain  the  rationale  for  a 
command, and listen to objections or suggestions. This scenario accords with 
Hofstede’s observation that the Netherlands are low on power distance and 
masculinity.  Political  scientists have  arrived  at identical  conclusions  (e.g. 
Lijphart, 1984). Dutch managerial behaviour is therefore dictated by shared 
understandings: since each group is fully aware of being part of  the larger 
community, it is therefore willing to suppress parochial interests. 
France exhibits yet a different set of folkways. Executives are not for sale. 
The various  groups  that  make  up  an organization  are part  of  a class,  a 
professional  group,  or  an  estate.  While  each  one  is  out  to  preserve  its 
narrow stakes and maintain  its position  of  power  and privilege, it is also 
bound by  a sense of duty and responsibility. Both laterally and vertically, 
people  in  organizations  will  insist  on  their  traditional  rights,  guard  their 
autonomy,  and yet  at the  same time  be  devoted  to the  service of others. 
Crozier (1964) provides a vivid description of the interplay between produc- 
tion  and  maintenance  workers  in  French  tobacco  plants.  In the  case  of 
executives, the prototype  of  estate with  its ethos of honour  is dramatically 
illustrated  by  the  ‘Grand  Corps’. This  corps  comprises  a  group of  male 
graduates of leading French universities who have easy access to positions of 
power  but  also  serve  with  dedication  in  these  positions  (compare  also 
Suleiman, 1978). For d’Iribarne, this code of ethics, or what he calls ‘logique 
d’honneur’,  negates  the  need  for contracts or lengthy,  consensus-producing 
meetings. 
In spite of  their difference in theoretical and empirical approaches, Hof- 
stede and d’Iribarne show a fairly high degree of consistency. We can surmise 
that masculinity and individualism, which rank comparatively highly in the 
US, are consonant with employment contracts showing detailed stipulations 
about compensation and marginal productivity of labour. Consequently, US- 
style labour contracts would be meaningless in France and the Netherlands. 
In France, work motivation appears to derive very much from a code of ethics 
anchored  in  the  privileged  position  of  various  occupational  groups.  One 
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might speculate that individuals embedded into any of  these well-ingrained 
stratified groups manifest  some form of  collectively shared power  distance 
values. 
METHODOLOGY 
We are now ready to present some preliminary findings on executive compen- 
sation in a comparative context. Qualitative data about executive compensa- 
tion practices from a select set of US and European companies are compared. 
By  analysing  prevailing opinions  among executives, we  hope  to  arrive at 
cognitive  scripts displaying an expectancy or  agency paradigm,  to extract 
implicit information about their value systems in general. Culture provides 
the  premises  for  attitudes  and  beliefs  (Eoyang,  1980), gives  meaning  to 
practices and conventions to which people are exposed, and furnishes a frame 
of  reference  for  decision-making  scripts  and  behavioural  scenarios.  The 
executives’ verbatim statements are subsequently incorporated into a multi- 
national framework and tested with a comparative data set. 
Data collection through semistructured interviews was conducted during 
1985-8  with executives in a small set of firms in each of the three countries. 
The  interview questions examined the executives’ interpretive schemes on the 
effort-performance  and performance-pay  contingencies,  and explored  the 
extent to which  they  felt  their organization was  capable of  linking  pay  to 
performance. Fifty-one executives in twenty US firms, five executives in three 
French firms, and eleven executives in six Dutch firms shared their percep- 
tions  about these compensation issues. In each firm, compensation officers 
were used as informants to identify the presence of compensation plans and 
their  associated practices; the  compensation officers possessed background 
information on any historical developments within a company and could also 
provide an assessment of the effectiveness of various practices. 
Firms were selected from a listing provided by a US executive compensa- 
tion consulting firm. As clients, these firms are likely to be more concerned 
with compensation issues than are non-client firms. Some of them are private. 
Most  of  them  belong  to  well-established,  Fortune  500-type  firms.  They 
represent  a  variety  of  industries  in  the  service  sector,  such  as  banking, 
publishing, telecommunication, and public utilities, as well as the manufac- 
turing sector (electronics, steel, aluminum, food, aerospace, chemical, phar- 
maceutical, building products and paper). 
The executives  used  as  informants  typically  included  a  compensation 
director or human resources  officer, an officer from  the strategic planning 
department, and a few line executives. Rank among the latter varied from 
CEO to divisional and group vice president. An interview typically lasted for 
about 60 to 75 minutes. All interviews were taped and transcribed. 
The issues that were addressed included the following: 
1.  The nature of the present executive reward system. 
2.  Perceived function of executive compensation plans. 
3.  Link between pay and strategic performance, if any. 
4. Recent changes in compensation practices. 
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Published  data, such as those from annual reports, proxy statements, and 
popular press articles on each firm were also collected. 
RESULTS 
The fieldwork sought to uncover interpretative schemas with the expectancy/ 
agency theory as a base line. While much of the inquiry focused on cross- 
national differences, it should be emphasized that variations also existed in 
perception and attitudes within firms, and among various industries, mitigat- 
ing against cultural differences, if  any. The above four themes were scruti- 
nized to expose the relative saliency of expectancy- or agency-like beliefs and 
opinions, and the presumed  cultural values of  which these paradigms may 
be indicative. 
Nature of  Present Compensation Plans 
Of the three sets of firms, only the US set showed a widespread presence of 
long-term executive  compensation  plans.  While  all  the  US firms have  an 
extensive formal executive compensation plan, however, some of them could 
be  classified as  not  providing  this  variable  (contingent compensation) , as 
contingent pay is stable, predictable, and linked to salary level and is viewed 
as having no bearing on corporate performance. Indeed, in two cases (electro- 
nics and steel), the formula under which variable compensation was to be 
paid had been  ‘adjusted’ in order to ensure a steady, continuous payout - 
even  though  the original, underlying performance clauses would  not  have 
justified such a reward. In the absence of long-term executive compensation 
in Europe, it became more meaningful to further review bonuses as a phenome- 
non that could vary within and between countries. The size of this payout in 
Dutch and French companies was rather small and uniform, ranging from 0 
to  10 per cent, whereas among US firms sharp differences occur, with the 
bonus payments often exceeding the salary by several multiples. 
With the exception of a trading firm turned conglomerate, all Dutch firms 
downplayed  differences  in  executive  compensation,  granted  insignificant 
bonuses (when a bonus is defined as a performance contingent pay-out), and 
rarely granted stock options. Fixed compensation and salary increases were 
seen  as  having  little  to  do with  accounting  measures  such  as  return  on 
investment  (ROI) or market indicators of  corporate performance,  such as 
ratio  of  market  to  book  value.  The most  significant  determinants  were 
perceived  to be  the executive labour market an3 subjective evaluations by 
superiors. 
Most French companies provided only fixed compensation. In fact, of the 
original French list of consulting clients, over 60 per cent did not pay any 
bonuses  in  1987, and many  from  the remaining  category  were US-owned 
French subsidiaries. Recently, however, some exceptions have surfaced. Two 
French companies that had introduced more variable compensation elements 
in 1987 were selected to identify and analyse their unusual stance. Executives 
were  more  prepared  to  expect  performance  improvements  as  a  result  of 
greater  uncertainty  in  compensation,  although  they  were  reticent  about 
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hailing  its  efficacy.  Interestingly,  executives  from  these  firms  had  been 
recruited mostly from the Grandes Ecoles -  that is, elite universities such as 
the Ecole  Polytechnique  and the Ecole Nationale  d’  Administration - and 
appeared well entrenched in their old boys’ network. 
In contrast, the US firms showed results that ranged from the pattern of 
their Dutch counterparts to organizations  with  extraordinary variations in 
both fixed  and variable compensation. Overall ROI and other accounting 
measures of  performance  were  seen as  most  critical  in  shaping fixed  and 
variable compensation; these measures are usually adjusted by norm-setting 
comparison  with  a  peer  group.  The peer  group  is  sometimes  a  set  of 
competitors in the same market or a reference group of Fortune 500 firms; at 
other times, the comparison set is a mix of both, or a standard furnished by 
a compensation  consulting firm.  Among  many US firms,  there is also an 
aggressive use of bonus and long-term contingent pay systems. 
Beliefs about Functions of  Executiue Compensation 
Apart from  the  above descriptions  of  actual  practices,  it  is  interesting  to 
present  attitudes and  beliefs  about  how  or why  executive  compensation 
works. Expressed beliefs about the function of executive pay vary consider- 
ably among executives. Some of the quoted statements that follow may serve 
to highlight the functions attributed to pay. 
A French compensation director stressed that 
executive pay is becoming more of an open issue that we can discuss during 
the last few years. Yet we should not brag about compensation  as many 
people consider executive pay a private and secret matter. . . . It is scanda- 
lous  [honteux]  to  have  high  earnings,  which  are seen  as demotivating, 
anyway . 
A Dutch executive employed by a food-related firm indicated likewise that 
money is not a factor in executive motivation. Senior managers are motivated 
by  intrinsic factors such as challenge or professionalization.  If the topic of 
pay variation is broached, executives are baffled: 
Not the foggiest idea why you get a salary increase. Sometimes you receive 
a letter about something that went wrong. . . . We have a shared responsi- 
bility, the argument being that we are interdependent. 
One of  his  superiors was  further  probed  about pay  policies  and variable 
compensation in relation to performance. He appears very adamant about the 
inquiry: 
We do not believe in it. Even profit-sharing payouts are fixed beforehand 
and can be found in the budget. We would not allow the polishing of results 
to boost a payout. Profits are due to a lot of factors, depreciation, setting of 
replacement value and so forth. . . . We differ from the U.S.,  where historic- 
al prices induce people to focus on short-term profits, so that their business 
becomes very cyclical. People cannot wait five, ten years before they get the 
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results on the basis of which they are paid. . . . We let the people grow with 
the business. Their best reward is promotion. 
This statement contrasts rather starkly with the attitude of a US colleague, 
also in a food-related industry. His firm’s CEO was often referred to as the 
Harold  Geneen  of  the  industry; divisional  managers  were  evaluated  and 
rewarded exclusively on the basis of profitability.  (Harold Geneen, as CEO 
of  ITT, presumably  controlled  all  his  divisions  solely  through  a  small 
accounting unit that monitored their return on assets; he treated his business 
executives in accordance with their bottom line.) The food executive evidently 
espoused an aggressive Harold  Geneen credo. He appeared  to  be  heavily 
preoccupied with pay and was eager to share his thoughts about the virtues 
of variable pay: 
As far as the annual incentives, people know what the goals are. And down 
in the operating companies, most senior managers of  the companies use 
those goals [net profit after taxes] on a regular basis to tell the people where 
they are going. Personal goals are based upow achieving that basic profit 
target.. . . Personal  goals  are  then  strategic  activities  which  relate  to 
achieving those goals. . . . You  add the annual incentive and you  bring 
people up to around the 75th [percentile] and although it is nice to have an 
umbrella, we are not afraid to be the highest paid executives, based on our 
plans. . . . [but also] we never change goals. If the British taxes doubled in a 
year and all the profits went to the government after the targets had been 
accepted, no adjustment of goals. . . . 
Overall, executives from US firms express a strong belief in the motiva- 
tional efficacy of executive compensation systems, whereas their French and 
Dutch counterparts  tend  to  be  cautious or  even ignorant. The views of  a 
Dutch multinational corporation executive are typical: ‘The relationship of 
accountability and bottom line and the internal organization is very complex. 
Our efforts and results are very indirect due to this complexity’. Moreover, 
a long lead time makes the action-result experience very tenuous. Executives, 
including the CEO, are motivated by a mixture of immaterial income, such 
as challenge, pride, freedom, resources, and so on. Such income also removes 
the need for contracting and fosters a collaborative atmosphere. A Dutch food 
and drink manufacturer does not even pay bonuses, since its CEO believes 
variable payouts to be counterproductive. One of  that corporation’s execu- 
tives specifically mentioned the ‘professional’ behaviour of managers and the 
psychological income they derive from having a responsible position. 
In summary, bonuses and other forms of variable compensation presume 
flexibility in tying pay to performance. Since variable pay makes for a more 
immediate connection, individuals attribute a greater motivational effect to 
it,  at least  among  US  executives  in  several  industries.  Many  European 
executives  are more  sceptical,  either  because  they  have  little leverage  in 
impacting corporate performance indices, or because an executive is moti- 
vated by many other factors. On closer inspection, it appears, however, that 
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their reaction is grounded in more than scepticism. They understand compen- 
sation as having a different function and a different relationship to perform- 
ance than do American executives. 
Perceived Eficag 
These quotations and observations have a distinct bearing on the perceived 
motivational  efficacy of variable compensation  payouts, which surface pri- 
marily in US and European firms that have recently undergone reorganiza- 
tions in compensation practices. In a Dutch conglomerate, for example, an 
unusual aggressive reward system was instituted in  1986; and although the 
implementation  could  not  yet  be  evaluated,  executives  in  the firm  were 
positive in their assessment of the intended effect. As much as 40 per cent of 
their total compensation could  be variable -  a huge proportion within  the 
Dutch tradition, in which the range is customarily 0 to 10 per cent of salary. 
Of all  executives  surveyed,  these  were  the  only  ones  who  believed  that 
variable compensation has a positive impact on organizational performance. 
In France, a publishing house that had established a variable compensation 
package in  1987 was likewise optimistic about its beneficial impact. 
A representative of a French biscuit firm, which  had been acquired by a 
US multinational corporation and which also had become more assertive in 
creating financial differentiations in accordance with performance appraisals, 
expressed strong convictions about its imminent success: ‘The  jury is still out 
there, but I do not have any doubt that this is the way to go’. 
The view prevails in the US that variable compensation is sound practice. 
Yet,  major deviations from  the myth of market-like employment contracts 
were  found  among American  executives  in  steel,  aluminum, utility,  and 
electronics firms. While the electronics organization  was European-owned, 
the first three constituted older, blue-chip US corporations. They diverged 
not only from the Dutch conglomerate or French food manufacturer, but also 
from US conglomerates and food manufacturers. The initial conclusion was 
that differences in beliefs regarding executive compensation do surface, but 
that such  beliefs  are a function  of  corporate, industry,  or market  culture, 
rather than national culture. 
The most explicit effort in relating strategic performance to compensation 
was found in an American defence and aerospace firm, in which executives 
received  a score card on the creativity and the soundness of their strategic 
thinking  as  these  qualities  manifested  in  their  business  plan  and  their 
presentation  before  an executive committee.  Over 30  criteria were used  to 
determine pay-relevant  strategic  and operational  performance.  Other US 
firms employing far less complicated  algorithms  were nevertheless equally 
aggressive. They referred, for example, to the futility of mentioning excuses 
for having failed to meet long-term strategic performance targets and avowed 
their willingness to increase the proportion of variable compensation to nearly 
100 per cent. Corporate or divisional  success here  translates into personal 
success and becomes attributed to personal effort and skill. The compensation 
package is presumed to mirror this conception and likewise serves to confirm 
its validity to the incumbent and his peers. 
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The Link Between Pg  and Strategic Performance 
The motivational efficacy of variable compensation is obviously related to the 
notion  that,  in  reality,  effort  can  be  tied  to  performance.  If  the  link  is 
transparent, compensation can be seen as a carrot-and-stick situation. Execu- 
tives would not be motivated  to make decisions should they perceive  their 
performance-derived  outcomes to be minimal or even absent. 
In the US, the strongest doubts about effort-performance  were expressed 
by executives in so called non-discretionary industries, that is, industries with 
a  strong dependence  on  business  cycles,  and  low  R&D and  advertising 
intensity.  The assumption  is  that  when  an  industry  shows  little  or  no 
expenditures in R&D or advertising, its firms do not enjoy much latitude in 
expanding supply and demand of products or services.  Mining  and other 
commodity-type  producers are good examples. A steel executive compared 
himself  with  executives  of  an  Ohio  petroleum  company  who  enjoyed  a 
windfall in 1973, not because of their business acumen, but because of the 
Arab oil embargo and the subsequent cartel-induced  price hikes.  For him, 
such an anecdote is evidence of the futility of individual executives in making 
a dent in their firm’s performance; it is, rather, a belief in luck and chance 
(Rotter, 1966). In contrast, in a food company, the belief was  widespread 
that any executive can make a difference, even when confronted with an act 
of God: even though such acts cannot always be anticipated, their effects most 
certainly could be forestalled or buffered  by an executive’s decisions. When 
executives in these firms were told about their colleagues in a steel firm, they 
dismissed such comments outright, pointing out, ‘Entrepreneurs sometimes 
enjoy windfalls, too’. When French and Dutch executives were probed about 
incidental efforts to introduce variable compensation, however, they tended 
to dismiss such acts as American faddishness or misguided moves to restore 
com  peti tiveness. 
Changes in Executive  Compensation 
Both in France and in the Netherlands, compensation officers discern a slow 
but steady trend  toward  de-levelling. The term  ‘de-levelling’ refers  to  the 
reintroduction of and re-emphasis on wage and salary differentials as a way 
to recognize variations in talent, responsibility, and above all, performance. 
Levelling was perceived to be widespread in the 1970s, when society was said 
to have valued a far-reaching degree of egalitarianism. As one Dutch Labour 
Party politician indicated, ‘The CEO should not earn more than twice what 
the janitor makes’.  The quest to restore income stratification is not always 
smooth. It also shows that many people in  the US have the inclination  to 
associate variable pay with high levels of pay -  a link not always borne out 
by the facts. 
One  officer, however, laments that in his company, managers do not always 
have the guts to say he is 0, you are 100%. . . . It happens all too often that 
we are more generous than frugal. The salary committee has the nickname 
Santa Claus Committee. 
While bonuses are modest, his company does issue what is called one-time 
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bonuses for exceptional performance; these, too, however, are constrained by 
guidelines set by the salary committee. One implication of level compensation 
is the absence of conflict and strife in compensation matters, relegating any 
dispute to the presence of those extraneous guidelines. This is in accord with 
the observations made by d’Iribarne (1989, pp. 230-2). 
Consistent with the perceived de-levelling, one diversified firm has aggres- 
sively modified the compensation system by reducing each executive’s salary 
by  35  per  cent,  with  the  presumption  that  each  of  them  is  expected  to 
counteract  this  diminution  in  fixed  income  by  increasing  their  variable 
income. After a period of extensive acquisitions, in 1988 a new profit-sharing 
concept was introduced with implications for individual compensation: 
We made individual  contracts with  every business unit manager. He in 
turn draws up contracts with his managers, to be approved by the board. 
The idea is to filter ‘spot-contracting’ down all the way to the shop floor, 
although the proportion variable is not as high in this country. 
A publishing firm in France is likewise experimenting with a new plan, but 
the results of its implementation are still too tenuous to be  evaluated. Its 
compensation officer believes strongly that ‘we have to go the American way 
to keep Europe competitive’. 
Ironically, while all respondents can be assumed to maintain a positive 
attitude  toward  compensation  innovations,  several  compensation  officers 
express a critical opinion. An executive from a Dutch consumer durables firm 
(food, tobacco, etc.) views experiments such as those in the French examples 
as eendugsvlieg, or faddish. He doubts whether Europe will follow US practices 
‘where historical financial performance induces people to focus on short-term’ 
profitability. He also questions the use of stock options. 
Stock prices are not affected by strategic initiatives. I do not even know the 
current  value  of  our  stock!  It is  meaningless  for  the  executive  who  is 
interested in the long-term health of the firm. Retained earnings is the way 
to grow. Stock options enrich the free riders and the tax man. It is not going 
to work; our president has a long-term view of the company and prefers to 
stay away from the stock market gyrations. 
This firm pays a fixed  bonus of approximately  10 per cent, payable at the 
end of  the  calendar  year.  The company’s  culture would  resist  more  pro- 
nounced pay differentials; it would jeopardize the prevailing consensus and 
camaraderie among the team of executives. As one executive put it: 
There is interdependence in performance, some have an ‘easier’ job than 
others,  but  foremost, pay  differences would  create jealousy.  Moreover, 
three-fourths of pay increases goes to taxes, so why bother? 
In short, this firm’s executives are strongly sceptical about imminent changes 
in executive compensation practices in Europe. The views about changes - 
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whether positive or negative -  have not yet been tested in a way that permits 
a fair assessment of their benefits. 
Retreat  from  Variable Compensation 
In the US, some interesting retreats from the earlier euphoria about variable 
executive  compensation  are discernible.  In fact,  in  the  1980s,  a  flood  of 
technical  innovations emerged  that related  an executive’s  compensation to 
performance  on the basis of a complex formula comparing a firm’s internal 
rate of return to the market cost of capital. These advanced formulas often 
proved  counterproductive.  A  manufacturer  of paper products  dropped its 
long-term executive compensation plan in 1989, since the only executive who 
understood its underpinnings was the treasurer, who has an MBA in finance, 
and ‘even he had to do a lot of homework’. The CEO told us that the firm 
had gone back to square one, which he defined as straight bonuses and some 
stock options, with  performance  comparison  based on the traditional  peer 
comparison  companies.  In no way, however,  does such a  change signal a 
retreat from  recognizing  the  individual  achievements  of  executives.  Such 
plans  were  initially  construed  as  an  innovation  to  draw  an executive’s 
attention away from short-term (or ‘quarterly’) time horizons in favour of a 
more long-term focus. Apparently, the long-term focus renders ethereal the 
connection  between  performance  and expected compensation, particularly 
when the algorithm linking the two is complex and tenuous. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This article has presented a first attempt to explain differences in executive 
reward systems as at least partially a function of cross-cultural differences. 
Differences in executive compensation appear significant and are arguably a 
function  of  cultural  factors  suggested  by  Hofstede  (1980). These factors 
include individualism  and masculinity  values  in  the US,  France,  and the 
Netherlands, while also reflecting variations in traditions, such as those that 
define employees and employers as equal parties who are expected to abide 
by a contract. The findings present an addition to the body of knowledge that 
has emerged around the work of Hofstede, while also lending further credibil- 
ity to the findings of d’Iribarne. 
These authors assist in driving home an important point, often overlooked 
by academic researchers. Adherents of expectancy and agency theory rarely 
make reference to basic premises or assumptions inherent in their explana- 
tions. If one shifts the attention to another society, then one becomes aware 
of what these assumptions are. If we move to the French or Dutch context 
we cannot frame those assumptions, as these do not exist in the minds of their 
people. Indigenous assumptions instead  are, respectively,  about the role of 
class  or estate-based  civic  responsibility  in  France or  about co-operative 
teamwork in the Netherlands. Moreover, Hofstede (1983) has likewise con- 
vincingly demonstrated that paradigms  about human behaviour  are cultu- 
rally conditioned. Discussion of agency theory in these countries is ill-fitting 
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or even irrelevant. Political justice rather than market justice  (Lane, 1986) 
appears to be the motto here! 
The results are limited in  their generalizability, but clearly indicate that 
executive reward systems are more explicit, widely diffused, and prominently 
displayed in US firms. Executives express stronger beliefs in the feasibility of 
tying pay to strategic performance,  although such opinions are occasionally 
tempered,  particularly  in industries  that seem sensitive  to  business  cycles, 
and whose  technology  is  well  established  or whose  products  have  limited 
room for differentiation. It should be noted, however, that all US firms have 
an explicit  executive compensation system, while  most  French  and Dutch 
firms do not. Many Dutch executives express doubt about pay as an antece- 
dent of executive or corporate performance. Some of their firms are neverthe- 
less  experimenting  with  modest  attempts  to  institute  bonuses  to  entice 
executives  toward  higher  performance  levels.  It will  be  interesting  to  see 
whether these experiments will reinforce our scepticism, or whether they will 
suffer a demise not unlike that of other American skill-transfers as manage- 
ment by objectives (e.g. d’Iribarne, 1989; Hofstede,  1983). 
It is interesting to note that these findings are consistent with a parallel 
study that compared bonus as a percentage of executive pay among the three 
countries. Data on over 200 firms came from the same US executive compen- 
sation consulting firm. Bonus payments are small in Europe and show little 
variance,  compared with  those  of  the US.  Summary stepwise  regression 
results are listed  in table 11. Firm size, industry  (i.e. a dummy variable for 
sectors), and nationality  (i.e. a dummy variable for France, the US and the 
Netherlands), and the interaction between  industry and nationality  had a 
major effect on the dependent variable. It was found that bonus payments in 
the US are much bigger and more variable, although this tendency is more 
pronounced  in  some industries, most  notably, in  the food  and electronics 
industries. The interaction coefficient was not significant because the multi- 
plicative  term  involving two dummy variables  entailed  a  large number of 
degrees  of  freedom. The results  of table  I1 are highly  congruent with  the 
qualitative findings, offering still another indication that executive compensa- 
tion is culturally conditioned. 
Obviously, many more cross-national investigations are called for. These 
should include those who have values that are even more divergent, most 
notably Japan  and China  (compare Beatty  et al.  1988). For  example,  in 
Japan,  even  more  than  in  European  countries,  seniority  and  long-term 
attachment to the firm are the basis of  merit. Salary increases in Japan are 
less  likely  to  vary  sharply, particularly  when  compared  with  US samples 
(Bass and Burger,  1979). Such results resemble those involving Dutch and 
other European samples of executives  (eg. Hoekstra and Wilke, 1972; Ryter- 
band and Thiagarajan,  1968). Japan, however, is much more collectivistic 
than France or the Netherlands, scoring 33 points below France, which is the 
least individualistic of the three countries. The meaning of perks as recogni- 
tion  of  loyalty  and attachment to  the organization in Japan,  rather than 
measures to counteract heavy and regressive taxation, is a plausible explana- 
tion ( The Economist,  1987). 
Such observations acquire even more significance in the wake of increased 
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Table 11.  Stepwise regression  analysis of  executive  compensation;  three  countries for  the 
period  1985-1987 
Change in 
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globalization  both of societies and the firms based in their cultural milieu. 
This increased  significance  inheres  not  only in  multinational  mergers  and 
acquisitions,  but also  in  steep  increases  in foreign  investments  and joint 
ventures.  International activities  have  converted  numerous  firms  into so- 
called multinational corporations with establishments in two or more coun- 
tries. Such trends lead to the employment of locals by foreign-owned firms, 
the transfer of individuals across national boundaries,  and the concomitant 
need to design executive reward  systems that are compatible with both the 
firm’s compensation practices and the cultural traditions of the host country. 
Multinational firms face interesting challenges in balancing such factors when 
designing or implementing their compensation systems. Similar issues can be 
raised  for  executive  compensation firms  that establish  a global network  of 
agencies.  They, too, face the need  to match  their  activities  to the cultural 
idiosyncrasies of their clients’ national origin. 
NOTE 
*  The Jones Center provided financial support for this study. David Campbell and 
David Bussard assisted in data collection and data analysis. Comments from Edward 
H. Bowman, Sarah Corse, Deborah Dougherty, and Peter Sherer are appreciated. 
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